The global race to secure critical minerals is increasingly becoming a question of economic and national security. Governments are seeking to reduce their dependence on individual suppliers, strengthen domestic production and develop more resilient supply chains for materials essential to energy, technology and defence.
This represents a change in how resources are understood. Minerals are no longer simply inputs into industrial production: they are increasingly regarded as strategic assets underpinning the infrastructure of modern economies.
As Roberta Caselli, Commodities Investment Strategist at Global X, explains in the latest edition of Aureon Sessions, “governments increasingly regard critical minerals as strategic infrastructure.”
The demand story is relatively familiar. Electrification, renewable energy, electric vehicles and artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure all require significant quantities of raw materials. “The long-term questions remain which resources may become more strategically important and where supply could require additional financing to keep pace with demand,” Caselli notes.
Cyclical risk, changing demand trends, investment in future supply, policy support and geopolitical risks – all these form a key part of the current outlook for commodities and, as Caselli outlines, how these developments are influencing critical minerals markets and the wider implications for the sector..
Reading the cycle
Given the persistent impact of inflation, energy shocks and geopolitical tensions on the global economy, Caselli emphasises that “short-term commodity markets may remain volatile”. Structural demand from electrification or renewables expansion, for example, does not eliminate the cyclical characteristics of commodity markets, or their price sensitivity to a range of factors. “Global growth expectations, interest rate movements and the US dollar can all affect pricing … changes in interest rates may affect both cyclical and precious metals, industrial data from China can influence base metals and supply-related developments can create shifts in the market.”
That said, different commodities respond to these influences in different ways. Precious metals such as silver and gold can be affected by real interest rates and safe-haven demand. Industrial metals, meanwhile, remain closely connected to manufacturing activity and expectations for economic growth, especially in China.
This distinction is important because treating commodities as a single investment category risks overlooking the different forces affecting individual markets.
Copper illustrates the tension particularly clearly. In the short term, weaker economic activity can weigh on demand expectations and prices. Over a longer horizon, however, electrification, power infrastructure and the expansion of AI-related facilities may support a different underlying demand profile.
The distinction is between the timing of demand and its underlying direction. Structural investment themes do not prevent downturns, but they can influence the nature of the recovery and the markets’ longer-term requirements.

The time problem
One of the most important constraints facing the commodities sector is the mismatch between the speed at which demand can develop and the time required to bring new production online.
Investment in electricity grids, renewable generation, electric vehicles and data centres can create additional demand over a relatively short period. Developing new mines, by contrast, involves exploration, financing, construction and regulatory approval.
Caselli emphasises that “developing new copper mining capacity can take more than a decade, and these greenfield projects often face permitting risks as well.”
This creates a structural challenge. Even when producers recognise the opportunity presented by higher demand, they cannot necessarily respond quickly enough to prevent a tightening market.
The distinction between greenfield and brownfield developments is therefore important. Greenfield projects involve establishing new mining operations, whereas brownfield projects expand or restart existing facilities. The latter can sometimes offer a more immediate route to additional production because they build on existing infrastructure, Caselli notes, and “they often require less upfront capital, reach production sooner, and face fewer regulatory and permitting hurdles than new greenfield developments.”
This makes existing mines and potential restarts particularly relevant to the supply outlook. Recycling may also provide an additional source of material, although its contribution must be considered alongside the development of new production.
The scale of the potential imbalance is significant. Caselli warns that “without additional recycling and mining, a substantial deficit could materialise.” BloombergNEF’s ‘Transition Metals Outlook 2026’ projected that, without an estimated $332bn investment in new mines, a copper supply deficit could reach 44% of global demand by 2050.
The implication is that demand forecasts alone provide an incomplete picture of the market. It is also important to understand how much additional production is realistically achievable, how long it will take and whether the necessary capital will be available.
Chokepoints
Supply security is not simply a question of the total quantity of minerals available globally. It also depends on where materials are produced, how they are processed and which routes they take to reach end users.
Three distinct types of chokepoint emerge from Caselli’s assessment.
1. Geographic concentration
“China accounts for a significant share of several rare earths and critical mineral supply chains,” Caselli observes. This concentration creates exposure for countries and industries that rely on a limited number of suppliers.
Heavy rare earths are particularly important in this context because of the strategic relevance of their applications in critical sectors such as semiconductors, aerospace and defence, and the concentration of their supply chains. Indeed, as Caselli explains, “discussions surrounding rare earth supply have highlighted the connection between critical minerals, industrial policy and national security”.
She warns that “export curbs and shipment restrictions may affect the global availability relatively quickly, particularly for buyers outside China and sectors such as defence and aerospace.”
The risk is that a disruption does not need to affect global production as a whole to create significant difficulties for individual industries. Buyers dependent on particular sources may experience shortages even when material remains available elsewhere.

2. Processing inputs
Critical metal production also depends on materials and inputs beyond the ore itself. Sulphuric acid, for example, is important for copper processing in countries including Chile and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Disruption to shipping routes could affect the availability and cost of inputs – Caselli notes that “the Middle East conflict appears to remain a risk due to its potential impact on sulphuric acid prices and consequently on copper production costs” – and such disruptions could increase production expenses even without a direct interruption to mining operations.
This demonstrates how supply-chain vulnerability can extend beyond the commodity being extracted. A mine’s ability to produce is dependent on a wider network of industrial inputs and logistics.
3. Trade policy
Trade measures can also redirect physical commodity flows. The prospect of US copper tariffs has encouraged shipments towards the US market, potentially changing availability elsewhere.
US midterms prompted a reassessment of tariffs: Amid pressure to address affordability, reduced expectations for new US refined-copper tariffs could encourage inventories to return to international markets, potentially changing regional availability without resolving constraints on global mine supply.
Chinese physical availability remained tight: The Yangshan copper import premium reached record highs in late October, as lower copper concentrate imports and restrictions on scrap availability tightened physical supply in China. This highlights physical scarcity that could support copper despite weaker investor sentiment following the AI sell-off.
Policy and capital
As governments seek to reduce dependence on concentrated supply chains, industrial policy is becoming an increasingly important influence on the commodities market.
The objective is not necessarily to achieve complete self-sufficiency. Rather, governments are seeking to secure reliable access to materials through domestic production and partnerships with allied countries.
Caselli observes that, increasingly, “governments appear to prioritise domestic and allied supplies of lithium and other critical minerals used for energy, defence and AI infrastructure.”
This has implications for the economics of new supply. Projects may become strategically important not only because of their production potential, but also because of their location and the countries they serve.
Government support, permitting reform and investment incentives could help address some of the barriers facing new projects. However, policy priorities alone cannot guarantee that sufficient production will come online.
The remaining question is financing. Even where demand is visible and governments are willing to support supply-chain development, projects still require capital and a viable route to production.
This shifts attention towards the relationship between strategic importance and commercial viability. The relevant considerations include which materials governments are prioritising, which jurisdictions are likely to receive support and whether proposed developments can attract the capital required to become operational.
Beyond the mine: Food and gold
The same emphasis on physical resources extends beyond industrial metals. Food and gold illustrate how disruptions to supply, production costs and confidence in financial systems can influence other areas of the real asset landscape.
“Fertiliser is a significant input cost for grain production, while disruption to energy supplies or shipping routes may affect fertiliser flows,” Caselli observes, illustrating the range of commodities exposed to energy-market volatility and geopolitical disruption.
Middle Eastern shipping routes, including the Strait of Hormuz, are relevant to this picture. Disruptions can slow the movement of essential inputs, and the effects may persist beyond the immediate resolution of a conflict as supply chains adjust. Recent projections from the World Bank show fertiliser costs increasing by 14% in 2026.
Weather-related uncertainty adds another layer of risk for agricultural producers. “The key question this year may be less whether El Niño will affect global agricultural yields and more how significant the impact on net global food production will be,” Caselli says. Greater volatility in input costs and growing conditions could encourage investment in technologies that improve productivity and resilience, “such as advanced machinery, seed innovation, crop protection and irrigation”.
Gold offers a different expression of the real-asset theme. Its role as a reserve asset and potential safe haven means that demand can be influenced by confidence in currencies and financial systems.
Caselli notes that gold “has historically attracted demand for its potential diversification benefits and resilience when confidence in fiat currencies weakens”.
Responsible mining is another important consideration. The environmental and governance standards associated with extraction can influence a company’s ability to operate, obtain permits and maintain its social licence.
In this context, Caselli argues that “responsible mining in the gold sector may be viewed as a reflection of the quality of the operating model, so governance and environmental management may affect business resilience”.
The point extends beyond gold. As governments place greater emphasis on secure production, the ability to develop and operate projects responsibly becomes part of the wider assessment of supply reliability.
Where to look
The commodities investment case is increasingly shaped by questions that go beyond whether demand will grow.
Caselli highlights three considerations: how long it takes to bring additional supply online, how concentrated the relevant supply chain is, and whether government policy supports the development of new capacity.
Together, these factors help explain why the physical resource requirements of electrification, AI, defence and food security may have implications across several markets.
Short-term price volatility will remain a feature of commodity investing. But if critical minerals are increasingly treated as strategic infrastructure, the longer-term assessment must also consider the cost, location and reliability of the resources that underpin modern economies.
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